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National Bank Operating Subsidiaries Are Subject
to Exclusive Visitorial Authority by OCC as the
NBA and OCC Regulations Preempt State Visitorial
Authority Law: Watters v. Wachovia Bank
UNITED STATES - BANKS AND BANKING - PREEMPTION - The
Supreme Court held that an Office of the Comptroller of Currency
regulation that interpreted the National Bank Act to treat a na-
tional bank operating subsidiary by the same terms and condi-
tions as the parent national bank worked in pari materia with the
National Bank Act in preempting state law governing visitorial
authority over non-national bank mortgage lending companies.
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
The facts of this case were simple and undisputed.1 Wachovia
Mortgage registered in various states, including Michigan, for the
purpose of granting first mortgage loans. 2 On January 1, 2003,
Wachovia Bank made Wachovia Mortgage into a wholly owned
operating subsidiary. 3 As a result, Wachovia Mortgage informed
the State of Michigan that it would relinquish its mortgage lend-
ing registration because it now had a national bank parent in Wa-
chovia Bank. 4 The commissioner of Michigan's Office of Insurance
and Financial Services (OIFS), petitioner Linda Watters, replied
with a letter revoking Wachovia Mortgage's authorization to con-
duct mortgage lending in Michigan. 5
Wachovia Mortgage and Wachovia Bank then filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan,
1. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1565 (2007).
2. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1565.
3. Id. Subsidiary corporation is defined as "[a] corporation in which a parent corpora-
tion has a controlling share. - Often shortened to subsidiary." BLAcK'S LAW DIcTIONARY
368 (8th ed. 2004).
4. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1565.
5. Id. Wachovia Mortgage was authorized to conduct mortgage lending in Michigan
because of its registration with OIFS. Id. While national banks do not need to be regis-
tered with the various states in which they conduct mortgage lending, states require that
non-national banks register before authorization will be given to conduct mortgage lending.
Id. at 1565-66. In this specific instance, Michigan laws required national bank subsidiary
corporations to register before they would become authorized to conduct mortgage lending
in Michigan. Id.
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seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Watters in her
official capacity as commissioner. 6 Wachovia Mortgage argued
that Watters' authority over it under Michigan law was preempted
by the National Bank Act (NBA) and the regulations promulgated
by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC). 7 This author-
ity included requiring mortgage lenders to register with the state,
submit financial reports, submit to inspection, and give authoriza-
tion to the commissioner to regulate or enforce specific acts.8
Watters disagreed, stating that Wachovia Mortgage was not a na-
tional bank and therefore Michigan law was not preempted. 9 Wa-
chovia filed a motion for summary judgment. 10
The district court held that the NBA prevented state visitorial
authority1 from being exercised over national banks 12 and that
regulations promulgated by OCC extended this provision to na-
tional banks' operating subsidiaries. 13 Summary judgment was
granted to Wachovia Bank, and Watters appealed.14 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court decision.15 The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the issue of whether state licensing and auditing
agencies govern a national bank's operating subsidiary's mortgage
lending activities. 16
6. Id. at 1565.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1565-66. The majority stated:
The challenged provisions (1) require mortgage lenders-including national
bank operating subsidiaries but not national banks themselves-to register
and pay fees to the State before they may conduct banking activities in Michi-
gan, and authorize the commissioner to deny or revoke registrations, (2) re-
quire submission of annual financial statements to the commissioner and re-
tention of certain documents in particular format, (3) grant the commissioner
inspection and enforcement authority over registrants, and (4) authorize the
commissioner to take regulatory or enforcement actions against covered lend-
ers.
Id. (citations omitted).
9. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1566.
10. Id.
11. Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 158 (1905). This case defined "visitorial author-
ity" as "the act of a superior or superintending officer, who visits a corporation to examine
into its manner of conducting business, and enforce an observance of its laws and regula-
tions." Guthrie, 199 U.S. at 158.
12. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2000). This statute provided, "No national
bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law." Id. §
484(a).
13. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004).
14. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1566.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1564.
Watters v. Wachovia Bank
The Supreme Court affirmed, by a five-to-three vote, the lower
court decisions and held that OCC's superintendence over a na-
tional bank's mortgage business extended to their operating sub-
sidiaries and preempted any competing state licensing, reporting,
and visitorial authority where the operating subsidiary conducts
business. 17
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, began by citing the
NBA, the relevant statutory authority at issue.18 She recognized
that § 484 gave OCC the exclusive authorization of visitorial pow-
ers over national banks. 19 The majority continued by citing vari-
ous cases in which the Court pronounced that the NBA prevented
duplicative and burdensome state regulation over national
banks.20 While state regulation existed, the Court identified that
the state law would be preempted if it impaired the national
bank's authority under the NBA.
2'
Also, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the NBA granted a na-
tional bank authorization to conduct mortgage lending, albeit sub-
ject to OCC regulation. 22 Linking the statutes, she stated that
OCC has exclusive authority to examine and inspect national
banks when those banks engage in mortgage lending.23 The Court
posited that Michigan's laws were in congruence with the federal
statute. 24 The necessity of this exclusive authority of OCC over
national banks, according to the majority, guarded against resul-
tant confusion emanating from two separate authorities control-
ling a national bank in the same capacity. 25 Justice Ginsburg con-
17. Id.
18. Id. This statute provided, "No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial pow-
ers except as authorized by Federal law .. " Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2000)).
19. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1564.
20. Id. at 1567. "Federally chartered banks are subject to state laws of general applica-
tion in their daily business to the extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the
general purposes of the NBA." Id. (citing Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 290
(1896)). "[T~he States can exercise no control over [national banks], nor in any wise affect
their operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit. Any thing beyond
this is an abuse, because it is the usurpation of power which a single State cannot give."
Id. (quoting Farmers' and Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 34 (1875)).
21. Id.
22. Id. "Any national banking association may make, arrange, purchase or sell loans or
extensions of credit secured by liens on interest in real estate, subject to 1828(o) of this title
and such restrictions and requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe
by regulation or order." 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000).
23. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1568. National banks are "immune from state visitorial con-
trol" because exclusive authority to examine and inspect falls with OCC. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The Court noted that this was
precisely what the NBA was designed to prevent: 'Th[e] legislation has in view
the erection of a system extending throughout the country, and independent, so
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cluded that Watters lacked examination authority and enforce-
ment power as Michigan's OIFS commissioner over a national
bank.26
Watters argued that state authority should still control a na-
tional bank's operating subsidiary, although subject to OCC's su-
perintendence. 27 Justice Ginsburg disagreed. 28 First, a national
bank may conduct banking through an operating subsidiary. 29
Furthermore, here, the operating subsidiary was licensed and
overseen by OCC in the same way that the national bank would be
in conducting the same business. 30 The majority explained this
resulted from the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which author-
ized an operating subsidiary to conduct certain activities only if a
national bank was authorized to do the same.31 In authorizing
operating subsidiaries to conduct activities that their national
bank parent was authorized to do, GLBA subjected subsidiaries to
the same provisions and guidelines that a national bank must fol-
low. 32 Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the OCC handbook
viewed a national bank and its operating subsidiary as one and
far as powers conferred are concerned, of state legislation which, if permitted to
be applicable, might impose limitations and restrictions as various and as nu-
merous as the States."
Id. (quoting Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 229 (1903)).
26. Id. at 1569.
27. Id. Petitioner's brief stated:
The starting point in discerning Congressional intent is the existing statutory
text. The statutory anchor upon which this controversy rests is 12 U.S.C. §
484(a), which provides that "no national bank shall be subject to any visitorial
powers except as authorized by federal law" or as vested in the "courts of jus-
tice" and congressional authorities. Visitorial powers include the examination
and inspection of a national bank's books and records, as well as the enforce-
ment of laws applicable to a national bank's operations. The OCC, by adopting
12 C.F.R. 7.4006, has purported to extend the exclusive visitorial powers it has
over national banks to the State-chartered nonbank operating subsidiaries of
national banks. The plain language of § 484(a) does not permit such an exten-
sion; the term "national bank" has a defined meaning that does not encompass
nonbank operating subsidiaries such as Wachovia Mortgage.
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 12, Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (No. 05-1342) (citations omit-
ted).
28. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1569.
29. Id. "A national bank may conduct in an operating subsidiary activities that are
permissible for a national bank to engage in directly either as part of, or incidental to, the
business ofbanking ... ." 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(1) (2007).
30. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1569. "An operating subsidiary conducts activities authorized
under this section pursuant to the same authorization, terms and conditions that apply to
the conduct of such activities by its parent national bank." 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(3) (2007).
31. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1570. The court mainly relied on this language from GLBA:
"subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by
national banks." Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A) (2000)).
32. Id.
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applied the same standards and controls regardless of which en-
tity was performing the activities.
33
The majority recognized that Watters did not dispute OCC's
visitorial authority over national bank operating subsidiaries, yet
she sought to impose state regulation on them.34 Watters argued
that OCC's authority was not exclusive but rather would exist in
lieu of state visitorial authority. 35 The Court rejected this argu-
ment and analogized the burdens of duplicative state and federal
regulation over national banks as equally burdensome on operat-
ing subsidiaries.
36
The Court continued, noting that the interpretation of the
NBA's preemptive force previously had been extended beyond a
national bank.37 The Court did not look to the corporate structure
of the operating subsidiary to make its determination; rather the
Court equated operating subsidiaries to national banks because of
the powers granted to the national bank by the NBA.38 Also, the
majority noted that the guards against state interference of na-
tional banks when conducting business should extend to OCC-
licensed operating subsidiaries conducting the same.
39
Watters complained that if Congress intended to deny visitorial
powers to states over OCC licensed operating subsidiaries in addi-
tion to national banks, Congress would have expressed this explic-
itly in the NBA.40 The majority dismissed her argument for two
reasons. 41 First, the Court argued that no Congressional intent
could be discerned from the NBA concerning operating subsidiar-
ies because operating subsidiaries did not emerge until 1966, long




36. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1570.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1571. The Court explained:
[We upheld OCC's determination that national banks had "incidental" author-
ity to act as agents in the sale of annuities. It was not material that the func-
tion qualifying as within "the business of banking," § 24 Seventh, was to be
carried out not by the bank itself, but by an operating subsidiary.




41. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1571. The argument rested on Wachovia Mortgage's being
considered an "affiliate." Id. The court later distinguished operating subsidiaries as being
a type of affiliate. Id.
42. Id. at 1571. "Over the past four decades, during which operating subsidiaries have
emerged as important instrumentalities of national banks, Congress and OCC have indi-
Winter 2008 283
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rejected the argument because Congress and OCC had since dic-
tated that operating subsidiaries were subject to state law in the
same way as their national bank parents.
43
Second, Justice Ginsburg rejected Watters' argument because
the petitioner failed to make a distinction between an affiliate and
an operating subsidiary. 44 Watters' argument that national bank
affiliates were still subject to state visitorial authority was re-
jected by the Court because affiliates were able to conduct activi-
ties that national banks were not allowed to do. 45 According to the
majority, an operating subsidiary was just one type of affiliate.
4 6
In fact, Justice Ginsburg identified the difference by indicating
that GLBA explicitly authorized operating subsidiaries to only
conduct business that a national bank would be authorized to do
independently.4 7 This difference allowed the Court to subject op-
erating subsidiaries to a different analysis than affiliates gener-
ally.48
Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted that the OCC regulation at is-
sue clearly applied state law to operating subsidiaries and na-
tional banks in the same manner.49 The Court rejected Watters'
argument that OCC lacked authority to preempt state law by
promulgating this regulation. 50 The majority stated that the OCC
regulations merely illuminate what the NBA expresses.51 State
law cannot interfere with OCC's exclusive visitorial authority over
cated no doubt that such subsidiaries are 'subject to the same terms and conditions' as
national banks themselves." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Affiliate as defined by the NBA is "any corporation controlled by a national
bank, including a subsidiary." Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 221a(b) (2000)).
45. Id.
46. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1571.
47. Id. at 1572. Justice Ginsburg stated:
Notably, when Congress amended the NBA confirming that operating subsidi-
aries may "engag[e] solely in activities that national banks are permitted to
engage in directly," 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A), it did so in an Act, the GLBA, pro-
viding that other affiliates, authorized to engage in nonbanking financial ac-
tivities, e.g., securities and insurance, are subject to state regulation in connec-
tion with those activities.
Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. "Unless otherwise provided by Federal law or OCC regulation, State laws apply
to national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the
parent national bank." 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2007).
50. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1572. The Court stated: "[t]his argument is beside the point,
for under our interpretation of the statute, the level of deference owed to the regulation is
an academic question." Id.
51. Id. "Section 7.4006 merely clarifies and confirms what the NBA already conveys."
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national banks; as a result, as operating subsidiaries are dealt
with in the same manner, this preemption of state law was ex-
tended.
52
Justice Stevens wrote the dissent for a three-justice minority.
53
He focused foremost on the majority's lack of a direct provision
promulgated by Congress to immunize a national bank's operating
subsidiary from state laws. 54 This should have, in Justice Ste-
vens' analysis, prohibited the Court from ruling in favor of pre-
emption.
55
In analyzing a preemption case, Justice Stevens wrote that it
was paramount to construe the purpose of Congress. 56 According
to the dissent, interpreting the congressional purpose must begin
with the assumption that federal acts will not preempt the police
powers of the state absent a clear statement by Congress. 57 Jus-
tice Stevens then wrote that the NBA failed to state their purpose
in this regard. 58 The dissenting Justices argued that Congress
has never extended the NBA's preemptive force to operating sub-
sidiaries. 59 The dissenting opinion stated that the correct inter-
pretation of Congress' silence in regards to national bank "affili-
ates" in its explicit preemption language in the NBA was that the
provision should only be applied to national banks.
60
The majority expressed that Congress would not normally want
a state to interfere with powers expressly granted to a national
52. Id. "A national bank has the power to engage in real estate lending through an
operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the national
bank itself; that power cannot be significantly impaired or impeded by state law." Id.
53. Id. at 1573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1573 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Joining Justice Stevens in the
dissent were Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia. Id. Justice Thomas took no part in
the case. Id.
56. Id. at 1578. "Mhe purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption
analysis." Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
57. Id. "[I]n all pre-emption cases ... we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 485 (1996)).
58. Id.
59. Id. "Although this exemption from state visitorial authority has been in place for
more than 140 years .... it is significant that Congress has never extended 12 U.S.C. §
484(a)'s preemptive blanket to cover national bank subsidiaries." Id.
60. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1579 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "That Congress lavished such
attention on national bank affiliates and conferred such far-reaching authority on the OCC
without ever expanding the scope of § 484(a) speaks volumes about Congress' preemptive
intent, or rather its lack thereof." Id.
Winter 2008
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bank by Congress, and Justice Stevens questioned this reliance. 61
Any reliance on what Congress would normally want, said the dis-
sent, was meaningless when Congress had expressed its prefer-
ences. 62 Because Congress has only expressly preempted laws
that give states visitorial authority over national banks, Justice
Stevens posited that extending this preemption to operating sub-
sidiaries was erroneous.
63
The dissent also attacked the majority's reliance on language in
GLBA stating that operating subsidiaries should be treated in the
same manner as their parent national bank.64 Justice Stevens
questioned such language, pointing out that it does not exist in a
provision regarding preemption, but exists in the definition of the
term financial subsidiary. 65 Further, the GLBA's failure to men-
tion operating subsidiaries troubled the dissent. 66 The three Jus-
tices concluded that this language cannot be interpreted as pre-
empting state law regarding operating subsidiaries. 67 Justice Ste-
vens thought this reality was even more apparent when viewed
against the fact that GLBA dedicates other provisions that explic-
itly called for preemption. 68
The dissenters also questioned whether Congress authorized
OCC to preempt state law when regulating operating subsidiar-
ies.69 Justice Stevens argued that Congress did not authorize
OCC to preempt state laws-something with which Congress has
a wealth of experience. 70 The dissent explained that there was a
stark distinction between granting authority to immunize an op-
erating subsidiary from state law and granting authority to regu-
late an operating subsidiary. 71 While the NBA grants OCC the
61. Id. "As we explained in Barnett Bank, this Court take[s] the view that normally
Congress would not want States to forbid, or impair significantly, the exercise of a power
that Congress has explicitly granted." Id. (citing Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1581.
64. Id. The language referred to is the phrase "same terms and conditions." Id.
65. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1581 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. "Congress in fact disavowed any such preemptive intent. Section 104 of the
GLBA is titled 'Operation of State Law,' 113 Stat. 1352, and it devotes more than 3,000
words to explaining which state laws Congress meant the GLBA to preempt." Id.
69. Id. at 1582.
70. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1582 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1583.
286 Vol. 46
Winter 2008 Watters v. Wachovia Bank
latter power, Justice Stevens contended it did not grant OCC the
former. 72
Justice Stevens argued that the OCC regulations were not in-
tended to preempt state law, but to convey the OCC's prediction of
what a federal court would decide. 73 The dissent disagreed with
OCC.74 Justice Stevens added that the interpretation here should
not involve the regulation but rather the statute. 75 He reempha-
sized that the GLBA language lacked any statement of preemp-
tion. 7
6
Finally, Justice Stevens attacked the majority's underlying pol-
icy argument that preemption gives national banks the ability to
use operating subsidiaries as the equivalent of departments of the
banks themselves. 77 The dissent reasoned that a national bank
need only create a division or department, if that was its goal; a
national bank need not acquire or form a separate operating sub-
sidiary.78 Justice Stevens stressed the importance of the choice of
corporate structure because giving immunity from state visitorial
authority to operating subsidiaries results in a negative impact to
the competitive equality that the dual banking system created. 79
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1584. 'Taking the OCC at its word, then, § 7.4006 has no preemptive force on
its own, but merely predicts how a federal court's analysis will proceed." Id.
74. Id. The dissent, in determining this, went through the steps the OCC took in form-
ing § 7.4006. Id. The court stated:
First, the OCC observed that the GLBA "expressly acknowledged the authority
of national banks to own subsidiaries" that conduct national bank activities
"subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of such ac-
tivities of national banks." The agency also noted that it had folded the "same
terms and conditions" language into an implementing regulation. According to
the OCC, "[a] fundamental component of these descriptions of the characteris-
tics of operating subsidiaries in GLBA and OCC's rule is that state laws apply
to operating subsidiaries to the same extent as they apply to the parent na-
tional bank."
Id. (citations omitted).
75. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1584 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1585. "[N]ational banks might desire to conduct their business through oper-
ating subsidiaries for the purposes of controlling operations costs, improving effectiveness
of supervision, more accurate determination of profits, decentralizing management deci-
sions [and] separating particular operations of the bank from other operations." Id. (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id. Justice Stevens' policy reasons underlying his dissent surrounded the argument
that, "the OCC's regulation is about far more than mere corporate structure or internal
governance," but rather, "[iut is about whether a state corporation can avoid complying with
state regulations, yet nevertheless take advantage of state laws insulating its owners from
liability." Id. (citations omitted).
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In the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice
Marshall established the first case law on federal preemption of
state law in the realm of national banking.80 Nearly fifty years
later, near the end of the Civil War, the NBA was enacted, allow-
ing banks to incorporate as national banks.81 Aside from the vari-
ous enumerated powers that were vested in national banks, they
were also given any other powers essential to conducting their
business.8 2 When enacted, the NBA also explicitly preempted
state law by granting the newly created OCC exclusive visitorial
authority over national banks.83 At the time, many believed that
state banks would become obsolete, but the opposite occurred; a
dual banking system was created. 84
When the NBA was enacted, operating subsidiaries were not yet
recognized (or even conceptualized), though banks began to affili-
ate with other corporate entities and investing in businesses.
8 5
During the Great Depression, these affiliates were thought to play
a large role in many bank closings, inevitably leading to the en-
actment of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933.86 The Glass-Steagall
Act forbade affiliation with investment banks by any member of
the Federal Reserve.8 7 Soon thereafter, national banks were pro-
hibited from owning stock in any company, a move by Congress to
further limit bank affiliation with other corporate entities.88
It was the Comptroller of the Currency in 1966 that officially
acknowledged operating subsidiaries and declared that national
banks could own operating subsidiaries so long as the entity was
performing an activity that national banks were authorized to
conduct.8 9 After an attempt in 1996 by the OCC to permit operat-
80. 17 U.S. 316, 336 (1819).
81. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1566 (majority opinion).
82. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2000). This statute provides "all such incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on the business of banking." Id.
83. Id. § 484(a). This statute provides: "[n]o national bank shall be subject to any visi-
torial powers except as authorized by Federal law." Id.
84. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1574 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dual banking system is
the term used to describe the banking system in the United States which consists of both
nationally chartered "national banks" as well as state-chartered banks and other lending
institutions. Edward L. Symons, The United States Banking System. 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
1, 9 (1993).
85. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1576.
86. Id. The Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 168 (1933), repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
87. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1576 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1576-77.
89. Id. at 1577. '[A] national bank may acquire and hold the controlling stock interest
in a subsidiary operations corporation' so long as that corporation's 'functions or activities.
288 Vol. 46
Watters v. Wachovia Bank
ing subsidiaries to conduct business from which national banks
were prohibited, Congress passed GLBA, which impliedly distin-
guished operating subsidiaries and financial subsidiaries. 90
While mortgage lending under the original NBA was prohibited,
over the last century, such prohibitions have been lifted.91 In
1982, the current language of the statute was enacted to authorize
national banks to conduct mortgage lending and to give national
banks broad powers in that regard. 92 Because national banks,
therefore, were authorized to conduct mortgage lending, their op-
erating subsidiaries were authorized to do the same. 93
Ultimately, a 2001 regulation promulgated by the Comptroller
of Currency led to the development of the present issue when it
was declared that a national bank's operating subsidiary was sub-
ject to state law in the same manner as the national bank par-
ent. 94 Soon thereafter, numerous wholly owned operating sub-
sidiaries, and their national bank parents, challenged various
state regulations, which would lead to litigation across the na-
tion. 95 Four courts of appeals addressed the issue before the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in the present case. 96
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Wachovia Bank,
N.A. v. Burke,97 as well as the other courts of appeals to address
the issue, held as the Supreme Court eventually would in Watters,
that state regulations over national bank operating subsidiaries
• . are limited to one or several of the functions or activities that a national bank is author-
ized to carry on."' Id. (quoting 31 Fed. Reg. 11459 (Aug. 31, 1966)).
90. Id. Operating subsidiaries were companies that performed only activities that
national banks could perform themselves, while financial subsidiaries were companies that
could perform other activities, albeit with harsher regulations. Id.
91. Id. at 1576.
92. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (2000). This statute provided: "[a]ny national
banking association may make, arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit se-
cured by liens on interests in real estate, subject to 1828(o) of this title and such restric-
tions and requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by regulation or
order." Id. § 371(a).
93. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1576 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Investment Securities; Bank Activities & Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. 34784,
34788 (July 2, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2007)). This regulation provides:
"uinless otherwise provided by Federal law or OCC regulation, State laws apply to na-
tional bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the parent
national bank." 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2007).
95. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1565 n.1.
96. Id. (citing Nat'l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2006); Wa-
chovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005), affd 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007); Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke,
414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005)).
97. 414 F.3d 305.
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were preempted by the NBA and OCC regulations. 98 However,
vast differences existed in their analysis. 99
The Second Circuit's decision in Burke involved the same na-
tional bank and its operating subsidiary as in the present case,
albeit in the state of Connecticut.100 The facts of Burke were sim-
ple and undisputed. 101 As previously mentioned, Wachovia Mort-
gage became a wholly owned operating subsidiary of Wachovia
Bank on January 1, 2003.102 As they had done so in Michigan,
Wachovia Mortgage relinquished its mortgage licenses with John
P. Burke in his official capacity as Banking Commissioner of the
state of Connecticut.103 Less than two months later, Burke re-
sponded with a Notice of Intent to Issue a Cease and Desist Order
directed at Wachovia Mortgage, believing it to be conducting
mortgage lending business without a license. 10 4 Wachovia then
filed suit against Burke in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut. 
0 5
The court of appeals, like the majority in the present case, de-
tailed the relevant statutory authority of the NBA and the rele-
vant OCC regulations. 106 However, unlike Justice Ginsburg, the
court of appeals embarked on a preemption analysis that largely
incorporated the landmark case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.10 7 Chevron outlined a two-step test to
determine whether a federal regulation that purported to preempt
state law did in fact lead to preemption. 10 8 The first step is find-
ing out whether Congress has expressly dictated an intent to pre-
empt state law. ' 0 9 If it has, the analysis is over, because Congress'
intent has been manifested and the regulation either abides by it
or runs counter to it.110 Where Congress has not expressly dic-
tated its intent, or where that intent is ambiguous, the second step
98. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1565.
99. Burke, 414 F.3d at 324.
100. Id. at 309.
101. Id. at 310.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Burke, 414 F.3d at 310.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 311-13.
107. Id. at 315 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984)).
108. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
109. Id.
110. Id. "First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter."
Id.
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must be taken.' That step focuses on the reasonableness of the
federal agency's interpretation of the statute in promulgating the
federal regulation. 112 If the agency gave a reasonable construction
to the statute, the courts should defer to the agency's interpreta-
tion and find preemption. 113
The judges of the Second Circuit first turned, as dictated by the
Chevron rule, to whether Congress had expressly dictated its in-
tent to preempt through the NBA. 114 Finding language that
clearly stated that OCC has exclusive visitorial authority over na-
tional banks, the judges noted that no mention was made of oper-
ating subsidiaries. 115 Burke argued that Congress expressly gave
exclusive visitorial authority over national banks to OCC, but did
not do so in regards to their "affiliates."116 Congressional silence,
according to Burke, showed Congress did not intend to give visito-
rial authority to OCC in regards to operating subsidiaries. 117
After concluding that no express congressional intent was dic-
tated, the court of appeals determined whether the particular
OCC regulation enacted under a reasonable construction of the
NBA. 118 Commissioner Burke mainly attacked the OCC regula-
tion's underlying rationale: an operating subsidiary was essen-
tially equivalent to a national bank division or department and
therefore was apt to be treated in the same manner as the na-
tional bank itself. 119
Wachovia countered by arguing that there are benefits for na-
tional banks to owning operating subsidiaries as opposed to sim-
ply having them organized as a division of the national bank.120
The court of appeals favored the argument of Wachovia and OCC
111. Id. at 843.
112. Id.
113. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. "[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." Id.
114. Burke, 414 F.3d at 315.
115. Id. "No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized
by Federal law." Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2000)).
116. Id. at 315-16.
117. Id. at 316-18. The court of appeals rejected this argument because operating sub-
sidiaries were just one type of national bank "affiliate," and "affiliates" encompassed a
much broader category that was more heavily regulated. Id.
118. Id. at 318.
119. Burke, 414 F.3d at 318. 'The Commissioner focuses on and attacks a particular
rationale expressed for 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006: that 'operating subsidiaries are, in essence,
incorporated departments or divisions of the bank, and, accordingly, should not be treated




that state regulations should not hinder a national bank's choice
for a more desirable corporate organization model. 121
Ultimately, the court of appeals found that the OCC regulation
was promulgated under a reasonable construction of the NBA,
evidenced by policies guarding against state interference of na-
tional bank operations and national banks' use of operating sub-
sidiaries. 122 In finding the regulation reasonable, the court of ap-
peals determined that OCC should be given Chevron deference
and held that state law was preempted. 123 A few short months
later, Wachovia Bank's nearly identical case in Michigan was de-
cided by the court of appeals, this time in the Sixth Circuit.
124
Following the same analysis as the Second Circuit, the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that OCC should be given Chevron deference and there-
fore the state laws requiring state visitorial authority were pre-
empted.125 Justice Ginsburg never even mentioned Chevron in the
holding, yet affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision. 1
26
The majority opinion is sound in its analysis despite the vigor-
ous and compelling dissent by Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens'
more interesting argument focuses on the corporate structure of
Wachovia Mortgage rather than the OCC regulation itself. 127 Ste-
vens contended that Wachovia Mortgage was a state-incorporated
bank that benefits from the limited liability that incorporation
brings and therefore should be subject to state regulation in the
form of visitorial authority.128 The fact that Wachovia Mortgage
operated under state regulations for six years before becoming an
operating subsidiary of Wachovia Bank bolstered Stevens' argu-
ment. 129 The argument rests mainly upon a policy favoring the
competitive equality that the dual-banking system has thrived
upon. 130
It is a compelling argument when viewed from the position of
state mortgage lending banks that do not have national bank par-
ents. 131 From that point of view, competitors with national bank
121. Id.
122. Id. at 321.
123. Id. at 324.
124. Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005).
125. Wachovia, 431 F.3d at 563.
126. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1573.
127. Id. at 1585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Brief for the Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors as Anicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14-
15, Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (No. 05-1342) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
130. Id. at 13.
131. Seeid. at 14.
Vol. 46292
Watters v. Wachovia Bank
parents gain a competitive advantage by avoiding state visitorial
authority. 132  National bank parents benefit as well, being
shielded from any liability because of the corporate structure of a
separate operating subsidiary.133 As a result, Watters and others
argued that operating subsidiaries should be seen as national
bank affiliates, subject to dual regulations in this regard. 134 Such
a contention addressed the idea that it is unfair for operating sub-
sidiaries to get the best of both worlds in terms of the limited li-
ability garnered by creating a separate corporate entity as well as
the preemptive force granted to national banks under the NBA in
terms of visitorial authority. 1
35
Ultimately, however, such arguments failed on sound reasoning
by Justice Ginsburg and the majority.136 In terms of competitive
equality, it does not seem that operating subsidiaries will obtain a
competitive advantage. For instance, while Wachovia Mortgage
for six years operated under the superintendence of Watters in
Michigan, it was not subject to OCC superintendence. 137 If the
minority view had prevailed, Wachovia Mortgage would have been
subject to both while its state registered competitors were only
subject to state regulation, arguably a competitive disadvantage.
Furthermore, the majority relied on the reality that operating
subsidiaries were treated the same way as their national bank
parents.138 This contrasts national bank affiliates that garner
increased regulation because of their ability to carry on functions
that national banks were not allowed to perform themselves.
139
Operating subsidiaries on the other hand may only conduct busi-
ness that their national bank parent would be able to conduct on
their own.140  This difference has proved to be meaningful. As
pointed out in the majority opinion, in regulating the accounting
reports, OCC calculates the assets and liabilities of the national
bank together with its operating subsidiaries' assets and liabilities
and does the same in regards to regulatory limits.' 4 ' Financial
subsidiaries are not afforded the same privileges. 1
42
132. Id.
133. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1571 (majority opinion).
135. Amicus Brief, supra note 129, at 12.
136. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1571.
137. Amicus Brief, supra note 129, at 12.
138. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1572.
139. Id. at 1571.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1570 n.10. The opinion states:
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In terms of the overall consequences of the case, it is unlikely
much will change economically. There are some concerns that
consumers will be hurt because OCC regulations tend to be less
stringent than state regulations, but this argument lacks merit.
The vast majority of state regulations of mortgage lenders will be
largely unaffected by this opinion, and merely the governmental
body that exercises formal control in terms of superintendence will
change. The fundamental tools in evaluating these entities will
not change, and if it is found that reform is needed in this area in
terms of OCC's potentially "inefficient" superintendence, national
reform seems a better avenue than state based initiatives.
Timothy D. Kravetz
For example, "for purposes of applying statutory or regulatory limits, such as
lending limits or dividend restrictions, the results of operations of operating
subsidiaries are consolidated with those of its parent. Likewise, for accounting
• . . purposes, an operating subsidiary is treated as part of the member bank;
assets and liabilities of the two entities are combined. OCC treats financial
subsidiaries differently. A national bank may not consolidate the assets and
liabilities of a financial subsidiary with those of the bank.
Id. (citations omitted).
142. Id.
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